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Abstract When reviewing the research path of an author,
we are inevitably influenced by our own background and
approach. Tracing back the converging and diverging
assumptions of the authors with respect to Erik Hollnagel’s
research path, the paper focuses on the evolution of
cognitive psychology as resulting from an original distinc-
tion between two models of human cognition: the first one
more in line with the behaviourist tradition and the latter
with the cybernetic and ecological approach. The former,
which becomes dominant in the development of cognitive
psychology, marginalizes some aspects that prove crucial in
the latter. The concepts of anticipation and of intentional
behaviour, together with the notion of variability of normal
performance, are traditionally part of the cybernetic and
ecological approach to cognitive psychology. These con-
cepts have also been central in the development of the
ergonomic analysis of work activities. Throughout the
Resilience Engineering perspective, the two models of
human cognition are brought closer, while the concept of
competence is sketched as a possible mediator to a ‘‘posi-
tive’’ approach to Human Factors and Safety.
Keywords Human factors  Safety  Human reliability 
Resilience engineering  Competence
1 Introduction
There are researchers who develop a vast number of
studies; fewer who develop a research path and even fewer
whose research path develops alongside a discipline, and
up to a certain extent, it influences this development. Erik
Hollnagel is part of the latter. His research on Human
Factors and Safety has influenced Cognitive Psychology, as
well as Safety studies, where psychological and non-
psychological disciplines are deeply interrelated.
The interdisciplinary character of Human Factors and
Safety is discussed in the beginning of this paper to draw
the context for the psychological contribution to the dis-
cipline. Both engineering and sociology required the
understanding of human behaviour to ensure safety for
industrial systems. Back to the 1960s, two different
branches of Cognitive Psychology were available to
understand and describe human behaviour. The first
branch of research goes under the definition of Informa-
tion Processing, where the computer was the most
exploited analogy for human cognition. In this trend, it is
possible to find most of the contributions Hollnagel
gave from the end of 1970s until the end of the 1990s.
Cognitive engineering, cognitive reliability and human
errors were the key terms and the main focus of interest.
While deeply implied in this research context (Hollnagel
et al. 1986, Hollnagel 1993, 1998), Hollnagel constantly
questioned this approach and he hinted at its limits
(Hollnagel 1978, 2005).
In parallel, particularly in the Francophone and Italian
tradition, a different branch of research has been developed
in cognitive and organizational ergonomics. (de Terssac
1992; de Montmollin 1984, 1990; Leplat 1980, 1993;
Oddone et al. 1981). Recognising the central role of the
cognition–action linkage, of the intentional behaviour and
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of the mental modelling of the everyday interactions, this
approach looked at humans as the flexible, adaptable
component of industrial systems. Humans were seen as the
essential component for the safe functioning of the system.
In the evolution of his personal approach, Hollnagel
among others, with the Resilience Engineering (Hollnagel
et al. 2006; Hollnagel et al. 2008a, b), clearly breaks with
the Information Processing tradition. The pivotal concept
of that tradition is somehow rejected. Humans are no
longer seen as the fallible components of industrial sys-
tems; they are rather considered as the key component of
socio-technical systems. It is due to their ability to locally
adjust their behaviour that the safe functioning is ensured.
It is probably in the ETTO (Hollnagel 2009) book that the
original two psychological branches of Human Factors and
Safety studies come in contact after more than 30 years of
parallel development.
The positive effect of performance variability is high-
lighted towards the conclusion of this paper. The concept
of competence is also suggested as a potential bridge
between the two branches of research. Taking into con-
sideration the role of competency can allow the develop-
ment of a discipline open to assert the crucial and positive
role of humans on the system safety.
Underlying Hollnagel’s contribution to Safety debate,
this paper wishes to pay tribute to a person whose ques-
tioning attitude has contributed—contributes and will
contribute—to improve the understanding of the nature of
risk and safety.
2 Human factors and safety: an interdisciplinary
domain
Work and research in Human Factors and Safety is a matter
of multiple disciplines cooperating towards a common
objective. Engineering, occupational sociology together
with cognitive psychology are the three main research
domains dealing with Safety and Human Factors. To
effectively tackle industrial safety, it is necessary that
contributions from the three disciplines are brought toge-
ther to understand and prevent risks.
After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Human
Factors discipline welcomed a reliable-based safety model
from the engineering tradition. In the engineering domain,
the predominant safety model was—and still is—based on
technical reliability and functional stability, in absence of
deviations and disturbances. From this perspective, humans
have traditionally been considered a highly variable and
therefore low-reliable component, whose operational
activities to the utmost comply with norms and procedures
to ensure correct and satisfactory performance. In this
framework, humans are considered as mere task executors,
which do not generate any additional value or knowledge.
For the engineering approach, risks due to the unreliability
of human behaviour have to be controlled and constrained.
Unfortunately, for this approach, ‘‘Complete control […]
does not exclude that an action can be incorrectly per-
formed. There is an underlying (or residual) variability of
human performance that cannot be eliminated.’’ (Hollnagel
1998, p. 152).
From the occupational sociology, strongly marked by
Charles Perrow’s theory on Normal Accidents (1984), the
Safety debate inherits the awareness that risks cannot be
entirely predicted and eliminated in complex and tightly
coupled socio-technical systems. Residual risk is due to the
emergence of undesired and unplanned interactions
between system’s components. While shifting the potential
for failure from humans to the system, Perrow highlights
the direct role of management ‘‘in preventing failures—or
causing them’’ (1984, p. 10). The nature of risk, in
Perrow’s words, goes far beyond the limits and boundaries
of human cognition: ‘‘Above all, I will argue, sensible
living with risky systems means keeping the controversies
alive, listening to the public, and recognising the essen-
tially political nature of risk assessment. Ultimately, the
issue is not risk, but power; the power to impose risks on
the many for the benefit of the few’’. (1984, p. 306).
For both the engineering and the sociological approach,
uncertainty (human and/or organisational) cannot be elu-
ded from the technical core of a system, and therefore nor
can the risks be completely eliminated. Systems where
uncertainty is present are always exposed to failures
(Thompson 1967).
Cognitive psychology was therefore asked to focus on
the characteristics and limits of human factors. Cognitive
psychologists contributed to the safety debate by either
designing consistent technologies with human resources
and limits or introducing barriers to reduce discretion and
to mitigate risks due to unusual combinations of events
(Cacciabue et al. 2000). Barriers aim to protect systems
from the fallibility of humans and conversely to protect
humans from the less-than-perfect predictability of the
system functioning.
To better understand the evolution of Erik Hollnagel’s
approach and to relate it to the approach of who is writing,
it is worth recalling the beginning of cognitive psychology.
In our opinion, in the early sixties, two research branches
outlined different models of human cognition that resulted
in different approaches to Human Factors and Safety. The
first one refers to studies, mainly developed by the
Anglophone Human Factors community, that model
humans as Information Processing Systems (Hollnagel and
Woods 2005). The second branch, developed mainly in the
Francophone and Italian ergonomics community, consid-
ered humans as adaptive systems that actively explore the
80 Cogn Tech Work (2010) 12:79–85
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environment and proactively adapt to it. (de Terssac 1992;
de Montmollin 1984, 1990; Leplat 1980, 1993; Oddone
et al. 1981).
3 Two branches of research for cognitive psychology
in human factors and safety
As known, in the Human Factors and Safety debate, the
Information Processing Systems (IPS) approach became
dominant. The computer provided a powerful analogy,
being the first technology capable of simulating the com-
plexity of human cognition through series of linear pro-
cesses. The development of the IPS paradigm went along
with the theoretical definition of structural limitations of
human cognition. The paradigm assumed that fallibility is
part of human cognition; it is therefore unchangeable.
The notion of Cognitive Reliability (Hollnagel 1998)
and the underlying Contextual Control Model (Hollnagel
1993) were consistent with this approach. Human cognition
was considered as a resource interacting with contextual
factors, but coming first, as far as a set of predetermined
limitations and capabilities. Coherently, the context was
defined as a set of factors that influence, modify and often
degrade the normal cognitive performance.
Despite being involved in the development of this
approach, Hollnagel questioned very early its assumptions.
One prominent feature of this linear paradigm is that
it is a rather passive system, which only processes the
information reaching it, another that information only
passes through the system in one direction. Although
there is experimental evidence for several compo-
nents of the system, e.g. the neural detectors, the
different types of memory, etc. it is incorrectly
regarded as a whole. It is incorrect precisely because
no system could survive in even a slightly compli-
cated environment, if it was only allowed to respond
passively to the information which reached it.
(Hollnagel 1978, p. 198).
Hollnagel’s scepticism about the linearity of human
cognition is entirely shared by the cybernetic branch. The
most appropriate technological analogy for this branch,
parallel to computer for IPS, could be the thermostat, being
the first and the simplest TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit)
unit capable of adaptive behaviour. To be adaptable,
the thermostat requires an Image of the world. In the
Boulding’s (1956) classification, the thermostat is the
simplest system cyclically querying its colourless and
soundless world to know the state of the single variable
(i.e. the temperature) it is looking for. The research path of
who is writing develops from the cybernetic branch with all
its implications, which go far beyond the difference
between linear and circular information processing: the
Miller’s (1960) analysis of auto-directed intentional behav-
iour and of the goal-oriented action; Neisser’s (1976)
priority of schema with respect to perceptual exploration;
Gibson’s (1979) concept of vista as prospective perception
from a personal point of view. On the basis of an
anthropomorphic model of humans, to quote the social
psychologists Harre´ and Secord (1972), the cybernetic
Image of cognition describes humans as active explorers of
the world, seeking for some kinds of information while
neglecting others, as if they were questioning their
environment. Explaining the concept of understanding
through an analysis-by-synthesis model, Hollnagel (1978)
notes that the hermeneutic circle represents a specific case
of this general model, which is quite different from the
Information Processing approach:
According to this model the process of understanding
takes place by a reciprocal interaction between two
processes, which are both normally unconscious. One
process produces a guess or an expectation of what
the meaning of the message could be. The other
process tests this guess against the message in order
to establish whether the guess and the message
coincide to the extent that one can say the message is
understood. All in all the process […] is identical to
the structure of a TOTE, as described by Miller,
Galanter and Pribram (1960). (1978, p. 202).
Further differences between the IPS and the cybernetic
branches of cognitive psychology should be here
mentioned.
The first difference: IPS was focused on information;
cybernetic on to the concept of difference: ‘‘Information
consists in differences producing a difference’’ (Bateson
1979, p. 135). In this view, the perception is defined as
checking a gap from an expected value, rather than
receiving information. It is active exploration (Neisser
1976), anticipation and detection of incongruities between
the desired and the actual state (Miller 1960).
The second one: as highlighted by Hollnagel (Op. Cit),
IPS is a passive system processing only the information
reaching it at a moment in time; for the cybernetic
approach, auto-regulation is a temporal process developing
through the interaction of the organism with the external
world: ‘‘The discrepancy between the target and the actual
response decides the next response in much the same way
as a golfer’s error on the putting green decides his next
putt’’ (Annett 1972, p. 10). This temporality is directed
by the expectations and goals of a subject challenging
an external world that offers resistance to his action:
‘‘Perception and cognitive activity usually are not simple
transactions at the mental level, but transactions with the
external world’’ (Neisser 1976, p. 35).
Cogn Tech Work (2010) 12:79–85 81
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The third one: IPS was concerned with human reliability
and human error, and variability was seen as a deviation
that grows larger and larger from the core of the system;
the cybernetic approach sees variability as a constitutive
feature of dynamic systems (Ashby 1960, p. 79).
In our opinion, being dominant in the Human Factors
and Safety debate, IPS marginalised several pivotal aspects
that were independently developed in the same years by
many Italian and Francophone ergonomists: anticipation
and goal-directed actions.
The concept of anticipation (de Terssac 1992) refers to
the cognitive activation humans experience while expect-
ing an event to happen. Such activation takes place before
any sensory information becomes available. This concept is
barely coherent with the Information Processing paradigm,
which does not account for the active search for informa-
tion and for expectations used to control action, while it is
quite consistent with the Neisser’s (1976) ‘‘picking up
information’’ concept.
In the ergonomic analysis of work, the concept of goal-
directed behaviour is fundamental (Leplat 1997), as well as
that of humans as action-oriented systems. Events in the
everyday world are considered as favourable or unfavour-
able, as positive occasions or obstacles. When an obstacle
prevents a goal-directed system from achieving its objec-
tive, the system tries to remove the obstacle or tries to
move around it or to make the most of it (Minsky 1986).
Since 2004, at least, Hollnagel’s unease with the IPS
basic concepts became more formalised. In the Barriers
and Accident Prevention book (Hollnagel 2004), the notion
of human error and human reliability is substituted by the
concept of performance variability. The book presented the
Functional Resonance Analysis Method as a non-linear
method to perform accident analysis and safety assessment.
The focus of the method is variability of normal perfor-
mance due to approximate adjustments.
4 Acknowledging positive effects of performance
variability
The traditional approach of IPS, as previously mentioned,
consisted in ensuring safety by designing and enforcing
barriers to reduce the number of human errors and to
mitigate their consequences, or in other terms to reduce
discretion and variability. Hollnagel somehow breaks with
this approach when he recognises that discretion and var-
iability are indeed the sources for incidents and accidents,
but in the normality, they are the source of successes and
functioning:
[…] failures represent the flip side of the adaptations
necessary to cope with the real world complexity
rather than a failure of normal system functions.
Success depends on the ability of organisations,
groups and individuals to anticipate risks and critical
situations, to recognise them in time, and to take
appropriate action; failure is due to the temporary or
permanent absence of that ability […] (Hollnagel
et al. 2008a, b).
Diverging from the Engineering approach and the Infor-
mation Processing paradigm, Hollnagel’s thinking, at this
stage, conceptually converges with the ergonomic
research based on the analysis of work activities, where
variability has always been recognised as a work domain
characteristic, rather than as a human limit. The assump-
tion is that standardised/linear performance does not exist
in real work. Accelerating and delaying factors can
change, but they always influence the execution time. For
example, Musatti (1971) recognised that the minimum
execution time, as well as the stability of the operative
process, are ideal models that encumber our representa-
tion and understanding of the real world, rather than
supporting us to understand it. Leplat (2000) distinguishes
between work-as-done and work-as-expected to describe
this situation.
In this research tradition, experienced workers are
described as constantly assessing upcoming situations and
anticipating possible future actions (de Montmollin 1984)
both in low technological tasks, e.g. like that of party-
structures installers or of traffic agents (Lacomblez et al.
2007), and in highly automated context, e.g. air traffic
control (de Terssac 1992).
When variability theoretically becomes a constitutive
part of the work, the analysis of interactions occurring
between human cognition and the situations in which
behaviour occurs (Hollnagel 1998, p. 31) gives place to the
concept of action as part of the context, rather than as a
dependent variable of the context (Bateson 1979, p. 374).
Overcoming the concept of linear cognitive-driven per-
formance potentially affected by shaping factors, the
analysis focuses on the normal system functioning
(McDonald et al. 2002).
From our point of view, clearly influenced by our
background and assumptions, the notion of Resilience
constitutes the transition point from an approach where
humans are considered the weak and unreliable compo-
nents of a socio-technical system to an approach where
humans’ contribution to the functioning and to the safety of
a system is mainly positive. It is in this transition that
Hollnagel’s path re-establishes a connection between the
two branches of cognitive psychology outlined at the
beginning of this paper.
Through the critiques to performance shaping factors,
the normal functioning of the system becomes the central
82 Cogn Tech Work (2010) 12:79–85
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point to better understand and manage safety. How this
understanding could be actually achieved? For the ergo-
nomic analysis of work activities, the main resilience factor
consists in the expert workers’ management of perfor-
mance variability in working settings. The concept of
activity does not merely consist of a behavioural response,
rather it refers to the psychological dimension of work:
‘‘What operators produce during their activity constitutes a
marginal part of that activity. The action, the act, the
choice they would have liked to do, but they did not, what
they are forbidden to do or they prohibit their selves from
doing, what they think it is inappropriate to do or they
could do if… are all moments of the activity and they all
constitute a major part of it. All these possibilities remain
in the subjective and collective activities as potentialities
waiting to be implemented’’. (Clot 2006, p. 11).
Substituting the view on humans as fallible executors
with the view on humans as intelligent producers of sys-
tem’s reliability implies the revision of the role and nature
of barriers and countermeasures and, among them, of
procedures. Since resilience cannot simply be ensured by
the respect of rules and procedures or by the ability to
recover from disturbances and to regain the normal func-
tioning, barriers, designed as constraining elements, are no
longer sufficient to make a system safe. The acknowl-
edgement of the positive effects, beside the well-known
negative ones, of variability requires the understanding of
the underlying reasons for successful performance.
5 From performance variability to competence?
To be positive with the functioning and safety of industrial
systems, performance variability has to be somehow suc-
cessful. In his most recent book, Hollnagel (2009) intro-
duces a trade-off principle to explain the underlying
reasons for performance variability: ‘‘ […] people (and
organisations) as part of their activities frequently—or
always—have to make a trade-off between the resources
(time and effort) they spend on preparing an activity and
the resources (time and effort) they spend on doing it. The
trade-off may favour thoroughness over efficiency if safety
and quality are the dominant concerns, and efficiency over
thoroughness if throughput and output are the dominant
concerns.’’ (Hollnagel 2009, p. 29).
Activities, at both human and organisational level, are
faced with a dilemma. Or people ‘‘[…] wait, to gather more
information, to see how things develop, or just to hope for a
greater level of certainty—or less uncertainty […]’’ or they
‘‘[…] go ahead on the assumption that the situation is
known well enough and the alternatives are clear enough—
and indeed that all reasonable alternatives are known.’’
(Hollnagel 2009, p. 28).
This, indirectly, relies on the use of competences. In
our understanding, only a competent operator can decide
when it is appropriate to wait (allocating time to think
about the situation) and when it is appropriate to act in the
situation.
In order to ensure safety in a dynamic system, operators
have to be taught not only the procedure, but also how to
make use of it, which is what operators usually learn by
experience. For an appropriate use of competences, pro-
cedures should therefore be considered as resources for
actions provided to experienced workers. Referring to the
concept of frame (Minsky 1986), procedures can be learned
and internalised as mental structures lacking their final
parts, which are to be built in relation to the actual situa-
tions. As shown by de Terssac (1992), in control rooms
dealing with an incident, warning is not only a matter of
more work to do, but also a matter of different work to be
carried out. In absence of alarms, control room operators
tend to work independently. When an abnormal situation
occurs, they collaborate to produce a collective response,
even when such collaboration is not prescribed by proce-
dures. In the same way, a strategy change takes place when
an operator is faced with an increasing amount of work.
After a first increase in his/her activity, a different action
plan is actuated (Sperandio 1980). In both cases, operators
seem to have pondered about the congruity between plan-
ned action and the actual situation.
In contrast to who sees in the non-compliance of pro-
cedures the fundamental cause of human errors and acci-
dents, we acknowledge that the lack of correspondence
between procedures and work practices occurs in both
accidental and non-accidental situations. This non-com-
pliance can be observed not only in situations prior to
accidents, but it is common practice in situations that do
not lead to negative outcomes (Snook 2000; Woods et al.
1994). This implies that the analysis of accidents that are
preceded by violations is pure tautology, since it is based
on a selection of cases where the sought result is present by
definition.
The relationship between competence and control con-
stitutes a further point where the two theoretical models of
cognitive psychology, and therefore Hollnagel’s and our
perspective, seem to take different paths. The Information
Processing paradigm can separate competence and control:
‘‘I have previously (Hollnagel 1993) presented an approach
to the modelling of cognition […] The basic principle in
this approach was a description of competence and control
as separate aspects of performance. The competence
describes what a person is capable of doing, while the
control describes how the competence is realised, i.e. a
person’s level of control over the situation. The level of
control clearly depends on the situation itself, hence on the
context.’’ (Hollnagel 1998, p. 152).
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In our understanding, it is as if the elementary TOTE
unit (Miller 1960) were broken down, therefore it is crucial
to stress the impossibility to dissociate control from com-
petence. No control can exist without competence, and vice
versa.
In this perspective, the analysis is no longer focused on
the acute pathogen elements, i.e. the human error, nor on
the chronic presence of latent failure conditions. The focus
of analysis shifts on the competency-based normal per-
formance, and how to support it. Coherently, the metaphor
classically proposed for safety is no more the classical
vulnerable system syndrome (Reason et al. 2001), but
rather the analogy with Health, understood as something
different from a disease-free state, or an initial asset to be
secured from attacks. In this view, health is rather to be
seen as a process of continuous construction, where the
working activities contribute through a stronger sense
of self-efficacy, as a result of social challenge and
cooperation.
Thus, if the approach based on human error reduction
and risk mitigation does not adequately account for the
importance of operational safety building processes, the
concept of competence can account for a positive view on
human factors and safety.
6 Conclusions
This paper sketched the evolving approach of Hollnagel, as
representative of a broader theoretical development of the
studies about Human Factors and Safety. Starting within
the Information Processing paradigm, Hollnagel’s research
path seems to highlight an evolution from the concept of
response to a concept of intentionality; from implementing
barriers to building safety; from modelling human cogni-
tion to understanding the resilience of a system; from the
concept of reliability to the concept of variability.
It seems that acknowledging the intentionality, the
proactivity and the variability of human performance
would require accounting for operators’ competence.
Despite, once again in our understanding, competence
is the underlying factor influencing the way in which
Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off takes place, Hollnagel
does not (yet) explicitly refer to it.
Nevertheless, competence comes to light whenever we
move from the notion of cognitive reliability to the central
role of performance variability in ensuring the safe func-
tioning of any complex socio-technical system.
The role of competences is well documented, for exam-
ple, in aviation maintenance, i.e. a highly regulated domain.
Several works describe how mechanics see successful
activities resulting from their ability to learn, to adapt, to
invent, to improvise and to find the right trade-off facing
pressures, demands, organisational contradictions and lack
of resources (McDonald et al. 2002; Van Avermaete and
Hakkeling-Mesland 2001). The same is true for Air Traffic
Controllers who pride themselves in their skills and under-
standing of rules and procedures to deliver the best service to
their clients (EUROCONTROL 2009).
A concluding question is addressed to ourselves: is our
understanding of Hollnagel’s research path actually cor-
rect? Two episodes suggest it could be. The first, during a
European project meeting, after hours spent in discussing
failures and human errors, one among us could not
restrain himself from saying: ‘‘To improve safety, the
concept of human error is inadequate. Operators are the
positive component of a system, it would be more relevant
to study workers’ operational and social contribution to
safety’’. Erik Hollnagel simply replied: ‘‘I could not agree
more’’.
The second episode took place during a cocktail-buffet
of an International conference. Once again discussions
during the conference were mainly focused on failures,
human errors, enforcing barriers and the like. To some-
one’s disappointment with these traditional topics and to
the rhetoric question if something will ever change, Prof.
Hollnagel replied: ‘‘It is 20 (maybe 30 A/N) years that I
have been arguing for a change in perspective. Who knows
that, one day, this will happen…’’.
In conclusion, still wondering to what extent we are
right in our understanding of the thinking and work of Erik
Hollnagel, while identifying in an unilateral way synergies
and divergences from our approach, we take comfort in
Gregory Bateson’s (1979, p. 26) words: ‘‘Those who lack
all idea that it is possible to be wrong can learn nothing,
except know-how’’.
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